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In recent years there has been growing attention to the epistemology of clinical decision‐making,
but most studies have taken the individual physicians as the central object of analysis. In this paper
we argue that knowing in current medical practice has an inherently social character and that imag-
ing plays a mediating role in these practices. We have analyzed clinical decision‐making within a
medical expert team involved in diagnosis and treatment of patients with pulmonary hypertension
(PH), a rare disease requiring multidisciplinary team involvement in diagnosis and management.
Within our field study, we conducted observations, interviews, video tasks, and a panel discussion.
Decision‐making in the PH clinic involves combining evidence from heterogeneous sources into a
cohesive framing of a patient, in which interpretations of the different sources can be made consis-
tent with each other. Because pieces of evidence are generated by people with different expertise
and interpretation and adjustments take place in interaction between different experts, we argue
that this process is socially distributed. Multidisciplinary team meetings are an important place
where information is shared, discussed, interpreted, and adjusted, allowing for a collective way of
seeing and a shared language to be developed.We demonstrate this with an example of image pro-
cessing in the PH service, an instance in which knowledge is distributed over multiple people who
play a crucial role in generating an evaluation of right heart function. Finally, we argue that images
fulfill a mediating role in distributed knowing in 3 ways: first, as enablers or tools in acquiring infor-
mation; second, as communication facilitators; and third, as pervasively framing the epistemic
domain. With this study of clinical decision‐making in diagnosis and treatment of PH, we have
shown that clinical decision‐making is highly social and mediated by technologies. The epistemol-
ogy of clinical decision‐making needs to take social and technological mediation into account.
KEYWORDS
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pulmonary hypertension1 | INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a growing attention to the epistemology of
clinical decision‐making.1–9 In this paper we argue that knowing in cur-
rent medical practice has an inherently social character and that technol-
ogies such as imaging play a crucial and mediating role in these practices.
The epistemology of clinical decision‐making needs to take the social and
technological mediation of clinical decision‐making into account.Creative Commons Attribution Li
al Practice Published by John Wil
wileyonlin1.1 | Teamwork in clinical practice
That teamwork is a crucial aspect in medical practice has been
recognised in sociological studies of medical practice. For example,
several studies10–12 draw attention to teamwork in the operating the-
atre, while others describe teamwork in clinical decision‐making.
Cicourel13 characterises the clinical diagnostic process as socially dis-
tributed cognition, which “refers to the fact that participants incense, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
ey & Sons Ltd
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possess.” Within this process, “physicians typically assess the ade-
quacy of medical information on the basis of the perceived credibility
of the source, whether the source is the patient or another physician”
(p. 222). Through discourse, physicians assess the area and level of
expertise of their coworkers and the reliability of their patient's
account of his or her illness to be able to evaluate the robustness of
the information provided.
Maseide14 also characterise medical decision‐making as socially
distributed cognition: “A ward conference, with a number of individual
members with different qualifications, functions, responsibilities, skills
and experiences, has knowledge and memory structures, procedures
of reasoning and practical qualifications that are socially distributed
and differ from the cognitive capabilities of the individual participants.”
He identifies 4 forms of evidence that “influence and regulate the judg-
ments and decisions of medical practitioners” (p. 44): scientific evi-
dence, evidence from personal experience, evidence as medical
representation artifacts, such as images and pathology results, and
“practical evidence,” which is, according to Maseide, closely integrated
with forms 2 and 3. This last form of evidence is cooperatively and col-
laboratively constructed: “practical medical evidence is generated,
developed and made useful locally by medical practitioners.” (p. 44)
There are several seminal studies of the social aspects of decision‐
making in the tradition of distributed cognition. Cohen et al15, for
example, considers decision‐making in the context of a psychiatric
ward, drawing upon a theoretical framework initially developed by
Hutchins.16 This framework considers cognition to be distributed
across individuals and artifacts, combining internal representations
(in the minds of individuals) and external representations (in physical
media, such as shared whiteboards). The account proposed here covers
similar terrain, in that it stresses the social—or distributed—nature of
knowledge processes, and the role of media, such as images. However,
as will be discussed later, there are important differences between
distributed cognition theory and our own.
This paper's main concern is with epistemology, that is, it aims to
shed light on the epistemology of clinical decision‐making and also to
contribute to the development of philosophical epistemologies able
to cope with these kinds of contexts. The paper argues that the social
nature of clinical decision‐making is an ineliminable aspect of its epis-
temology. By this we mean that an individualist epistemology, based
on a traditional analysis of knowledge in terms of individual knower,
is not adequate as a basis for an account of knowledge in clinical con-
texts and that sociability is a necessary aspect of the epistemology of
clinical decision‐making. The social character of knowledge in other
spheres has been recognised by many philosophers, an early example
in the turn to social knowing in scientific contexts being Hardwig17
who writes: “Knowing, then, is often not a privileged psychological
state. If it is a privileged state at all, it is a privileged social state. So,
we need an epistemological analysis of the social structure that makes
the members of some teams knowers while the members of others are
not.” The social structures of knowledge are increasingly acknowl-
edged in philosophical studies of scientific practice,17–21 but this has
not received the same degree of attention in philosophical accounts
of clinical decision‐making. For example, Montgomery's3 detailed anal-
ysis of how physicians deal with uncertainty and incompleteinformation in clinical decision‐making focuses on the individual doctor
in clinical‐patient interactions. Montgomery describes medical case
conferences in one of her chapters, foregrounding the establishment
of authority and hierarchy, as an aspect of the sociability of knowledge
practices. Cunningham22 shows the extent to which the sociability of
clinical decision‐making is increasingly acknowledged as a challenge
in philosophy of clinical decision‐making. He uses a distributed cogni-
tion theoretical framework as the core of his normative account of
clinical decision‐making. While overlapping in our concerns, the
socio‐technological epistemology we propose differs in its theoretical
orientation, as discussed in the concluding section of the paper. Finally,
we note that the position we advocate does not imply a “collective
knower” over and above group members, but we will not enter into
this debate here. Rather, our interest is in showing that the epistemol-
ogy of decisions regarding diagnosis and treatment is not fully
accounted for by appeal to individual knowers and does not do justice
to the complex coordination of teammembers with different expertise,
where social interactions play a pivotal role. The social epistemology
we propose is better able to develop an understanding of diagnosis
and management decisions made in clinical teams that are becoming
increasingly complex. Rapid changes in the availability and quality of
imaging, the development of new and expensive drugs, and an increas-
ing realisation of the need to place medicine in a social context for
patient benefit have driven the multidisciplinary team (MDT) to come
to the fore as a central place for shared decision‐making.
The essential role of technologies is also not normally included in
accounts of knowledge in clinical decision‐making. Technologies are
normally relegated to vehicles for evidence, but we argue that technol-
ogies, and evidence and knowledge claims made on their basis,
coevolve with each other and play an essential role in mediating the
social knowledge of clinical contexts. In this regard, images are most
often analyzed in terms of their ability to provide evidence for (scien-
tific) claims. For example, Perini23 analyzes how mechanically pro-
duced images are structurally related to the shape of the specimen
being imaged by being sensitive to certain aspects of a specimen and
indifferent to others. However, most medical imaging techniques are
not purely mechanically produced, but have a substantive informa-
tional component too. For example, Carusi24 argues “embodied in the
algorithm for image processing, there is a hybridity of causal factors
(the way in which the algorithm organises shapes and contours in the
image) and intentional/ informational factors. The resultant images
that are viewed for further interpretations are a hybrid of causal and
non‐causal factors.” In other words, the image is not the result of a
chain of causal factors, but of causal factors combined with factors like
processing algorithms, that are programmed with an intention to filter,
simplify, or interpolate data. Hence, medical images cannot be simply
regarded as “vehicles for seeing‐in” the body and image technologies
as “visual prosthetics” that provides direct access to the inside of
patients.25
In addition, several authors have argued that the process of image
analysis by radiologists or clinicians can be understood as a hermeneutic
system. According to Friis26 the interpretation of images takes place
preconsciously. He characterises image interpretation in terms of the
hermeneutic circle, in which the mind moves from parts to whole and
back to make sense of an image. Friis invokes the concept of gestalt
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are “something that stand out against a background and enables us to
identify patterns.” and that cannot be understood as a feature of the
image itself, but of the image in interaction with the perceiver. The per-
ceiver is in turn shaped by his or her background: Friis argues that visual
perception is an embodied skill that is shaped by biology, society, expe-
riences and training that together make up a personal “horizon”, mean-
ing that visual perception is variable from person to person. Therefore,
2 radiologists may interpret the same image differently, because of var-
iability in their horizon. Rosenberger27 argues that most images are
multistable, meaning that they can be interpreted differently by apply-
ing a different hermeneutic strategy, informed by “theoretical commit-
ments, explanations of the structures within the image's content, and
relations to the imaging technologies.” He applies this theory to an
ongoing debate in neurology, where the 2 opposing parties interpret
the same images differently. Questioning each party's hermeneutic
strategy, Rosenberger argues, can suggest further trajectories for
research by asking for a more detailed account of the morphologies
present in the image according to rivalling theories. These authors give
an account of how image and interpreter interact, but omit an under-
standing of how this interaction shapes the social distribution of know-
ing and mediates the interaction between different members of clinical
groupings. This is what we focus on in this paper. In her article on com-
puted tomography (CT) images as diagnostic tools, Friedrich28 proposes
that the interpretation of these images depends upon the development
of shared “sight styles” across radiologists in a clinic. Her account draws
upon Ludwik Fleck's notion of “thought styles” and “thought collec-
tives,” stressing the social processes and the role of technologies such
as software, through which people come to see in the same way.29,30
As will become apparent, the account we propose here is similarly ori-
ented toward the development of shared modes of seeing.
In summary, we will argue that rather than focusing on the individ-
ual clinician's reasoning and knowledge, it is more fruitful to think of
clinical decision‐making as a form of social knowing, in which technol-
ogies play a key mediating role. In such a system, decision‐making can-
not be performed by any one individual, but is instead performed by an
assemblage of people and instruments in coordinated actions. This
paper examines clinical decision‐making through a detailed study of
image‐assisted diagnosis and treatment of a pulmonary disease. The
study shows the knowledge processes involved among the different
epistemic agents with different expertise who collaborate on formulat-
ing decisions. We will show how in repeated interactions, medical
teams cultivate a collection of stable, agreed upon orientations toward
evidence and knowledge that establishes an intersubjective framework
within which claims and interpretations can be justified and decisions
can be arrived at and shared by others. Medical images, such as X‐rays
and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans, play an important role in
these assemblages of distributed knowing.1(1) Pulmonary arterial hypertension either idiopathic or associated with other
conditions, (2) pulmonary hypertension (PH) due to left heart disease, (3) PH
due to lung diseases and/or hypoxia, (4) chronic thromboembolic PH, and (5)
PH with unclear and/or multifactorial mechanisms.2 | METHODS
We have analyzed clinical decision‐making within a medical expert
team involved in diagnosis and treatment of patients with a complex
disease called pulmonary hypertension (PH), over the course of9 weeks. PH is a rare and life‐shortening disease characterised by an
elevation of blood pressure in the pulmonary artery and an increased
resistance in the pulmonary vasculature.31 This results in an enlargement
and decreased function of the right heart ventricle that causes breath-
lessness and limitation of exercise capacity that may be very severe.32
PH has a definition given in terms of a measure produced by an invasive
test of right heart catheterisation. It is further classified into 5 different
categories (with a number of subdivisions) according to cause,1 for
which different treatments are required.33 Images play a crucial role in
establishing the cause of particular cases of PH and are therefore impor-
tant diagnostic tools. A careful clinical history and a range of investiga-
tions are required to diagnose and categorise PH. The treatment
regime for the patient is based upon these tests and classifications and
can range from drug treatments to heart and/or lung transplantation.
The medical team in our research worked in 1 of 8 expert centres
in the United Kingdom and Ireland that diagnose and treat PH and con-
sists principally of pulmonary clinicians, a cardiologist, a nurse consul-
tant, specialist pharmacists, radiologists, junior doctors, specialist
nurses, and a ward nursing team. Although a study of clinical deci-
sion‐making is not complete without patients, patients were not
included in this particular study for pragmatic reasons alone, as our
ethical clearance did not extend to them. For this reason, the study
focuses on how images are used for diagnosis, which is an aspect of
the decision‐making process where the division of epistemic labor falls
more on the clinical team; a fuller study will also consider patients.34
Participants in the study were all members of the clinical team and
invited to contribute to the study and/or collaborate on it. The team
confers weekly in a ward MDT meeting discussing the management
of the current ward patients and a radiology MDT meeting where cur-
rent inpatients, patients in short‐stay admissions for diagnostic testing,
and outpatients may be discussed. Data were collected through
observing weekly MDT meetings, performing 11 qualitative semi‐
structured interviews with members of the clinical team, and
conducting a group discussion on emerging imaging technologies.
MDT meetings were not video or audio recorded as we did not have
ethical clearance for this; we recorded our observations in notes. In
addition, we video‐recorded a session of 2 radiologists collaboratively
reporting an X‐ray CT scan and an interdisciplinary meeting to deter-
mine the usefulness of an emerging imaging technique. All recordings
were transcribed and coded using NVIVO (QRS international Pty Ltd.
version 10, 2012). The data used for this particular study are the
semi‐structured interviews, which had framed our data collection in
terms of expertise, teamwork, and the role of imaging technologies.
The interviews were divided into 3 main sections: the interpretation
and use of images, expertise and trust, and the introduction of new
imaging modalities. The analysis of the data broadly followed these
categorisations, but also looked for connections between them, using
a grounded approach, that is, using the main topics and subtopics of
the interviews as a first iteration, and an open coding approach, looking
for relationships and groupings within and among these topics and
FIGURE 1 Room layout and contributions at weekly radiology multidisciplinary team. PACS, patient archiving and communication system
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themes. In particular, we looked for connections between the MDT
observations and the interviews with individual research participants,
as is evidenced in the discussion below.3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Social knowing in clinical decision‐making
Decision‐making in the PH clinic involves combining evidence from
heterogeneous sources, such as the patient's history, clinical examina-
tion, lab tests, images and measurements, awareness of personal and
social circumstances, observations of the patient by clinicians on ward
rounds and by ward staff, or interactions with family. One of the key
epistemological challenges of clinicians is to develop an account of
every individual patient based on the available evidence, a process that
involves the interpretation and adjustment of pieces of evidence so
that they form a cohesive and consistent “picture”2 of that patient.35
These pieces of evidence are generated and interpreted by different
people; for example, radiographers generate images by operating the
imaging apparatus when the patient is scanned, and by doing initial
data processing—which is in a sense, already a first form of interpreta-
tion; radiologists interpret the images, but so too do clinicians, with dif-
ferent levels of expertise. Nurses and clinicians generate evidence
through the patient history and clinical relationship, and their2We use the term ‘picture’ as it is used colloquially in the domain of our field-
work, without any commitment to representationalism. A non‐representational
account of pictures is not at all unusual; see footnote 7.interpretation provides the clinical questions that radiologists use to
direct their interpretation of the images. In these respects, the pro-
cess is distributed over people, working in different and overlapping
contexts, at different points of the patient's encounter with the clinic.
Part of the adjustment and interpretation of evidence occurs within
interactions with different experts, who from their different expertise
provide a specific outlook on evidence while fitting this in with other
evidence requires the interpretations of other experts. MDT meet-
ings play an important role in socially distributed knowing, for
instance, by providing a space where information and interpretations
can converge into a shared team decision, as also described by
Maseide14 and Cicourel13.
In our epistemological analysis of team decision‐making in the PH
service, we will demonstrate how MDTs need to combine the individ-
ual expertise of team members to be able to fit together all relevant
information that leads to a team decision and that therefore knowing
in distributed.3.2 | MDT meetings
We observed 2 types of MDT meetings: on the ward and in the radiol-
ogy section. Here, we focus on the second of these. In weekly radiol-
ogy meetings, the PH team of our field study reviews the imaging of
all patients in the last week, admitted for diagnostic testing, or admit-
ted for acute management of a deteriorating clinical condition, and
patients who are being (re)evaluated as outpatients. See Figure 1 for
an overview of the seating in radiologist MDTs. Radiologists have pre-
pared the meeting by reporting the available images and take a place
behind the workstation to navigate the different images using a patient
archiving and communication system (PACS). Images are shown at a
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tory physicians and a consultant cardiologist) take place at a table at
the front of the room, consulting the medical records of the patients.
Other attendees at MDTs are the radiographers who have scanned last
week's patients, junior doctors, registrars, and visitors. At most
meetings at least 2 radiologists and 2 consultant clinicians are present.
A usual interaction concerning imaging of a patient is structured as
follows: the clinician opens with an introduction of the patient, a sum-
mary of the previous course of the disease, clinical signs and symp-
toms, other test results, and sometimes a specific question. The
radiologist then draws up the images, compares results from different
imaging modalities, and compares current images with earlier images if
available. They show specific findings in the images and sometimes
ask for clarification about the patient's clinical history from the clini-
cian to refine their evaluation. After a series of interactions, the radi-
ologist summarises his or her view, with a response to any the initial
question, after which the clinician concludes the interaction by making
a note of the shared conclusion and the follow‐up plan for that
patient, which they say out loud while writing it down in the patient's
clinical record.
In these interactions, heterogeneous sources of knowledge and
information are fitted into a group decision by hearing voices that rep-
resent a range of expertise. Team members have different knowledge
and skills that stem from different backgrounds in training, but differ-
ent experts also interact differently with individual patients, their bod-
ies, and medical instrumentation such as imaging. For example, the
clinician has met the patient, has taken his or her medical history,
performed a medical exam (eg, listened to their heartbeat using a
stethoscope), and has studied lab results. Radiologists receive only a
short summary of the patient's history and the clinician's query, but
spend much time studying and interpreting the imaging results. Clini-
cians decide whether a patient will go for imaging or not, which
imaging modalities are used and which questions are asked, based
on their knowledge of the patient and in the context of a diagnostic
and management process aimed at understanding and treating an
individual to improve symptoms and prolong life. Radiologists are
guided by these questions, without having full access to how the
clinician came to that question or what were their reasons for
requesting a certain imaging exam for this patient. Conversely, physi-
cians are guided by radiologists' interpretation of their patient's
images to make clinical decisions, without having full access to their
interpretation, or the expertise that leads them to make the interpre-
tation (see Quote 1).Quote 1: Obviously, you can't read the entire patient
notes. So you want a clear summary of what the patient
has. Brief. And the best thing is if you've got a clear
question of what you want to ask from the imaging.
Sometimes the imaging…. you could come to multiple
conclusions, but if you've got a clear question that
makes it a lot easier because you can answer that
question and then everything else can be kind of
incidental finding, if you find other things. (P3, radiologist)responsibility.In short, within these groups, the epistemic labor is distributed
over different specialisms and experts, each with different roles andepistemic contributions. For example, radiologists are experts in the
way anatomical or pathological structures appear on different imaging
modalities, whereas clinicians have a complex understanding of
pathological processes and how these present as signs and symptoms
in patients. In exchanges in MDT meetings, these different expert
approaches help interpret the separate pieces of evidence in relation
to other available evidence, providing a refinement and enrichment
of these interpretations that a single expert would not be able to
reach on their own (eg, see Quote 2). Even though there are different
roles and expertise, they must overlap sufficiently for the interactions
among members to be meaningful; for example, clinicians in this
group described themselves as having more expertise on the images
relating to PH than other radiologists who do not specialise in this
area. What is generated is a palimpsest of overlapping and
superimposed knowledge rather than a jigsaw made up of discrete
pieces that fit together.Quote 2: And that's why an MDT environment is so
important... because... you need to have those
cautionary people who understand the limitations, so
usually the radiologists, to be able to advise the clinical
team, about your level of confidence. (P8, radiologist)These refined and enriched interpretations help to bring hetero-
geneous information together, into a shared framing of the patient, a
collective understanding of the patient's illness that is built up from
all pieces of evidence, where exchange between different expertise
is necessary to be able to adjust and reinterpret the available
evidence to be able to make them fit. Building this shared “picture”
of the patient allows them to come to a shared conclusion
concerning the diagnosis and treatment for him or her, which is usu-
ally written down in the patient's clinical record while being voiced
out loud by the consultant clinician. This voicing out loud under-
scores the shared ownership of the team's conclusion and decision
(see Quote 3).Quote 3: Actually within our services it's rather more
about you take the opinions of your colleagues and the
knowledge that you have as a team, and you work out
how to apply that with yourself as an instrument of the
team. So you're not placing yourself above anything, but
it's more that you're filtering, taking in all things that
you're told and trying to work out the best fit. (P1,
consultant respiratory physician)MDT meetings are geared toward consensus within the full team.
In most meetings, more than one radiologist and more than one clini-
cian are present, to have an extra pair of eyes and make sure that
things are not missed, and also because a conclusion or interpretation
that is shared by others is considered more reliable than when it is
reached by a single person. Hence, one of the purposes of MDT meet-
ings is to deal with uncertainty and incomplete information, which is a
challenge of clinical decision‐making.
3
The consensual nature of this
process is one way of managing responsibility for the patient, and
we would expect that distributed knowledge also leads to distributed
3The con
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least 2 or 3 radiologists in the team. So we take consensus
from the others as well, from the imaging. And if they all
agree, than it's more reassuring and then we can say on
our report or in the discussion, so for imaging this is
what it is (P4, radiologist)Members of the unit frequently mentioned that working in a team
gave them more confidence in their decisions, see, for example,
Quotes 4 and 5.3Quote 5: Usually people come to a consensus. Ehm...
and.... it's not just the two radiologists either, because
there's a lot of expertise in the imaging from the
clinicians as well. So we have like a collective... opinion.”
(P3, radiologist)Hence, the process of fitting together heterogeneous sources of
information into a coherent and consistent framing of a patient is a
collaborative effort, and MDT meetings are an important place where
information can be shared, discussed, interpreted, and adjusted,
allowing the development of a collective way of seeing and a shared
language. For example, after voicing the team's decision, the consul-
tant clinician also mentions the right heart catheter measurements,
which allows for a final check and last integration of all evidence and
which helps radiologists to get a feel for the correlation between the
imaging and right heart catheter findings. MDTs continue to play their
role when clinicians or radiologists are not in a meeting, first by know-
ing that they are held accountable for the quality, relevance, and
comprehensiveness of the information they provide at MDT meetings
and second by shaping the information that is gathered in such a way
that it fits the structure of the shared framework of the MDT.
In terms of epistemological responsibilities, it is interesting that
these include responsibilities toward the sociability of the team. Team
members have an epistemological responsibility to weigh up evidence
according to their knowledge and also to open up their deliberation to
others, justifying to others how they come to a certain interpretation
while being sensitive to deliberations and interpretations from others.
If we take an overarching epistemological responsibility of each person
to be toward a sound shared decision regarding the care of patients, an
aspect of that epistemological responsibility is inherently social in char-
acter. This means that it is not an epistemological plus a social respon-
sibility, side by side, but both at the same time. This is seen in the more
detailed example of image interpretation in the next section.3.3 | Distributed knowing in image interpretation
The structure of distributed knowing is especially clear when dealing
with images. Kelly Joyce (2005) demonstrated that the use of MRI is
local, embodied and contingent, for three reasons.36 Firstly because
in the production of the image parameter choices by radiographerssultant clinician is ultimately responsible for the patient, legally and in
anisational structure of the hospital; however, there are tensions
this ultimate legal and organisational responsibility and the consensual
f the decision‐making process. These are interesting and important
ut space does not allow them to be explored here.while physically scanning a patient influence the resulting image, sec-
ondly because the interpretation and translation of the image by
trained radiologists produces a report that remains open to divergent
interpretations and lastly because imaging can conflict with other avail-
able information and can be taken up by the clinician in various ways.
No one in the PH team in our field work has complete knowledge of
the images. Although radiologists are considered the experts when it
comes to medical images, they perform their role within an assemblage
of other medical professionals and instruments. As argued above, to
fully evaluate imaging, it is necessary to fit with other evidence and
interpretations of this evidence by other experts, such as the clinical
story as provided by the clinician. In addition, important components
in this knowledge‐generating assemblage are the physical MRI, the
work of the radiographers who operate the scanner and instruct the
patient and subsequently process the data to produce high‐quality
images and metrics of the right kind, and software systems such as
PACS to share, view, and analyze imaging and to add reports. None
of these components, clinicians, radiologists, radiographers, scanners
and software, can be omitted from an account of knowledge genera-
tion in the context of PH diagnosis.
For example, the PH team makes use of an MRI scan called cardiac
magnetic resonance (CMRI) to assess the anatomy and function of the
cardiac chambers. A typical CMRI sequence requires synchronisation
of MRI information with a person's heart rhythm as measured via elec-
trocardiogram for as long as 40 minutes, which enables reconstructing
a moving image of the heart during the cardiac cycle (this process is
called “cardiac gating”). This image sequence resembles a beating heart,
and this is used to assess the function of the heart by visual assess-
ment of chamber anatomy, contraction, and potential leaking of heart
valves. The right heart function is relevant for prognosis and disease
severity, while the left heart is assessed to exclude left heart disease.
In addition, images are processed to quantify predetermined parame-
ters relevant to cardiac function, such as ejection fraction (the amount
of blood pumped by the heart with each heartbeat) and calculated car-
diac output (the amount of blood pumped per amount of time). For
example, to measure the right ventricular ejection fraction, a measure
held to be clinically important by correlating with disease severity
and prognosis, the volume of the right ventricle is measured at two
moments in the cardiac cycle: immediately before contraction (the
end‐diastolic volume) and immediately after contraction (the end‐sys-
tolic volume). This is done by drawing the contour of the right ventricle
in all slices covering the right ventricle volume for the two points in the
cardiac cycle.37 A radiographer draws the right ventricle contours after
which a software program calculates the ejection fraction and other
metrics characterising the right ventricle function that are summarised
in a report containing numbers and diagrams that the radiologists
receive in PACS.
The above description of the production of one MR metric
employed to make clinical decisions demonstrates how knowing in
clinical practice is socially distributed. Radiographers make a knowl-
edge claim by drawing the contour of the right ventricle, defining
which part of the image refers to the ventricle wall and which to
the inside of the ventricle. They are able to make such a knowledge
claim because they have developed a way of looking at these images,
as part of their education and experience, but more importantly in
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who establish the relevance of this knowledge claim—demarcating
the border of ventricle wall—by relating it to a clinically relevant met-
ric—the right heart ejection fraction. For radiologists to evaluate the
right ventricle ejection fraction, and thus make a knowledge claim
about disease severity or prognosis, they require knowledge claims
made by radiographers regarding the right ventricle wall in order
for the measure to be processed. The two types of knowledge claims
develop in tandem with each other, through iterative cycles during
which the border of the right heart ventricle is picked out for clinical
relevance, and the radiographers draw the border in such a way that
the radiologists can use it for their decisions. In short, knowledge in
this small instance is distributed over at least two people who both
play a crucial role in generating an evaluation of the right heart func-
tion, and who both play their roles embedded within a broader team
and other interactions, with other radiographers, radiologists, and
consultant clinicians. No one person has complete knowledge of
the images, and the knowledge each does have is in virtue of their
interactions with others. Each person is responsible for how he or
she contributes to the knowledge of others and not only to their
own piece of the puzzle. This contribution includes responsibilities
toward openness to others and recognition of oneself as part of a
team.4Images might also play a role in the interactions between clinicians and patients;
however, we did not study these interactions in our field work.
5An imaging modality that plays an important role in PH diagnosis is the echocar-
diogram, but interestingly, this modality is hardly ever referred to, let alone
displayed at multidisciplinary team meeting. This probably has to do with the fact
that echocardiograms are not shared via the same patient archiving and commu-
nication system, with the user‐specificity of US images and that interpretation of
these images requires cardiologic expertise. Another modality that is relatively
little referred to is electrocardiography.3.4 | The mediating role of imaging technologies
In our field study, the physicists, radiographers, and radiologists
involved in PH imaging are highly specialised and have a long history
of collaboration, developing methods to analyse and evaluate CMR
images and metrics together. The technologies, for example, the
scanner, the sequences facilitating the acquisition of CMR images,
the image processing algorithms and the software tools that enable
drawing the right heart ventricle contours, calculating the ejection
fraction and sharing the results, play a crucial and active role in
these processes. The technologies, the users, the ways of looking,
and the possible knowledge claims coevolve with each other. Kelly
Joyce (2006) demonstrates how MRI coevolved with ways of looking
by describing its historical development.38 MRI was originally devel-
oped as a tool to measure the composition of materials in physics
and chemistry (spectroscopy) and later, driven by the “war on can-
cer” in the United States, attempted to be modified into a tool to
measure tissue composition and ultimately into an imaging method.
The images produced by MRI were initially in full color and included
an array of numbers. After being taken up by radiology, MRI scans
were presented in gray scale, fitting the images radiologists were
already familiar with and the existing technological constraints. In
the field of PH, this coevolution is also evident. MRI, by producing
a specific type or contrast, between different types of soft tissues,
drives a specific kind of visualisation of the heart muscle, and
the method of electrocardiogram‐gating allows visualisation of
movements of the heart during a complete heart cycle, enabling
CMRI. Clinicians and radiologists involved in diagnosis and treatment
of PH, from being familiar with heart anatomy and physiology,
recognise the relevant structures (ie, septum, ventricles, and valves),
and from being familiar with what type of information is required inclinical practice, they recognise which relevant questions might pos-
sibly be answered by these types of imaging. However, they need to
learn how to recognise deficiencies and how to evaluate function by
relating images to clinical outcomes. Together with an ongoing and
rigorous discussion, these interactions among radiographers, radiolo-
gists and clinicians, and the imaging technologies, push the develop-
ment and tweaking of acquisition sequences to improve image
contrast for those specific practices, and image processing and anal-
ysis algorithms to produce relevant metrics such as right heart ven-
tricle ejection fraction.
In repeated interactions, medical teams cultivate a collection of
stable, agreed upon orientations toward evidence and knowledge
that provides an intersubjective framework within which claims and
interpretations can be justified and decisions can be arrived at and
shared by others. Medical images play an important role in the
building of these intersubjective frameworks in three ways: first, as
enablers or tools in acquiring information; second, as communication
facilitators; and third, as pervasively framing the epistemic
domain.24,39,40 Through these 3 mediating roles cumulatively and
simultaneously, imaging modalities are active shapers of the
epistemic domain, for example, by shaping what counts as evidence
for specific diagnoses and by shaping classificatory structures and
treatment régimes for diagnoses.
That images are enablers or tools in acquiring information
is clearly evident throughout the history of imaging, as from the first
X‐ray, images have been a powerful means of pushing back the
limits of observation. In the PH field, continued research on imaging
such as CT and MRI has allowed a visual detection of several
mechanisms causing PH (eg, chronic blood clots in the lung, lung
emphysema, left heart disease, etc) leading to more reliable clinical
categorisation and development of specific diagnosis and treatment
approaches according to PH‐group. Because images play such a
crucial role in the diagnosis and management of the disease, they
play a prominent role in interactions and communications among
the members of the medical team.4 This is obvious in the radiology
MDTs, where the images are discussed, but also clear in the ward
MDT meetings. These are led by different consultant clinicians in
different weeks, and there is variation in the display and reference
to displayed images depending on which consultant clinician leads;
mostly the images relating to the patient discussed are displayed
and discussed; at the very least, they are always mentioned and
referred to.5
The third mediating role of images, as pervasively framing
the epistemic domain, is closely related to its other two roles, but
relates to the sheer scale of image use and research in the
domain. MRI became routinely used in the PH unit that we studied
8 VAN BAALEN ET AL.since 2004.6 Since its introduction, even artifacts of CMR imaging
have been found to be diagnostically useful, as in the case of the
so‐called black blood artifact,41 and other imaging technologies
and other tests become less used. The introduction and develop-
ment of a new imaging technique or modality usually runs along-
side and piggybacks on an existing one, as it needs both to
cohere with and go beyond the existing techniques and modalities.
As we have discussed, the ability to interpret and use the images
coevolves with the development and implementation of the tech-
nology, and the expertise and skill with which images are
interpreted are built up through continued use over lengthy periods
of time, in interaction with other people. When an imaging modal-
ity overcomes a critical point and becomes dominant, it pushes out
other preexisting modalities. For example, in Quote 6 there is a
radiologist describing how MRI perfusion in combination with accu-
rate CT pulmonary angiography came to be used in their unit as an
accurate, noninvasive test that ultimately replaced the more inva-
sive pulmonary angiogram:6The dev
classifica
beyondQuote 6: P4…so looking at perfusion you could see the
lungs taking up contrast. So if it's even in both sides of
the lungs, then that's fine. But if you see like defects,
you know like big chunks out of contrast that's missing.
Than that's a feature of chronic thromboembolic
disease. So we started noticing those.. changes.
[…]
P4: before, we used to use, just contrast angiography,
so what we used to was, to look at the pulmonary
arteries, we used to just inject contrast and then just
look at the flow of the contrast in the pulmonary
artery. So very... it's an invasive procedure, so you
have to have a catheter put in the groin and... but,
that's more or less obsolete these days. So we don't,
we hardly do one a year.
Interviewer: do you notice anything... do you miss
anything about images that…. modalities that you, you
know... is there any time that you would say, well we
could have seen that on...[a pre‐existing modality]
P4: the thing is, because we don't do it that often,
we're losing the skill to interpret the...
[…]
P4: So, you know, if somebody gives us a pulmonary
angiography now, I think we'll all struggle to identify
what's happening.When imaging modalities became so embedded into the
epistemic domain, it becomes difficult to get an external vantage
point on them, and they, in their turn, become the standards against
which continued imaging developments are assessed. The evidenceelopment of magnetic resonance imaging methods for PH diagnosis and
tion and the impact of these are another very interesting topic, but go
the scope of this paper and will be discussed in other papers.for defects in the lung, for example, comes to be constituted by
how this is visualised in perfusion MRI. In this way, images are per-
vasive mediators that can reshape the epistemic domain.
Thus, the epistemology of clinical decision‐making is also
ineliminably technological as well as being social; in fact, these two
aspects cannot be divorced from each other, as they are one in
virtue of being the other. The most powerful technological means for
probing a clinical domain cannot be used, cannot even have meaning
for that domain, outside of the social relations through which interpre-
tations are engendered and decisions are grounded. However, this
very process of using technologies effectively—which, we have seen,
requires expertise and skill that are honed through social interactions
—also makes it difficult to arrive at purely external assessments of spe-
cific technological developments once they become the norm, because
the process of producing the expertise to interpret them can also, par-
adoxically, remove the ground for making a comparison.4 | DISCUSSION
The study we conducted is a small qualitative study of clinical deci-
sion‐making in diagnosis and treatment of PH, involving only one
team in a relatively short frame of time. In this study, we focused
on images and the clinical team using and developing them, whereas
further studies need to broaden this out to consider others in the
process, in particular nurses and patients; in addition further
comparative studies of other PH teams would enable us to discover
how specific our findings are to this team. Even so, we believe that
it points to some important features of the social epistemology of
image‐mediated clinical decision‐making. We have argued that clini-
cal decision‐making is highly social and mediated by technologies,
in this case imaging technologies. Imaging, the ability to interpret
images, social practices, and the epistemic domain codevelop into a
socio‐technical epistemic framework in which members of the
clinical team exchange, discuss, and fit together evidence toward a
team opinion. These aspects of clinical decision‐making mean
that an individualist epistemology is inadequate. Instead, the
epistemology of clinical decision‐making is ineliminably social and
technologically mediated.
In this article we have emphasised the social nature of knowledge
in the process of coming to a shared way of seeing, or what Friedrich28
labelled “sight style.” This differentiates our account of socio‐techno-
logical epistemology from the tradition of distributed cognition, as
we do not invoke internal or external representations. Of course, the
word “representation” is frequently used in the clinic as elsewhere in
scientific contexts, but our emphasis has been on how something
comes to be agreed upon as a representation, and we do not take for
granted in advance that anything actually is a representation because
this assumes that it is already or a priori clear how to interpret it as a
representation. On our account, it is the process whereby an image's
status as being a representation of some aspect of the clinical situation
is established, that is at issue: as in our example, images come to rep-
resent the size of the right heart ventricle through an interactional
interplay between radiologists and radiographers that foregrounds
VAN BAALEN ET AL. 9the border of this ventricle and establishes a way of drawing it, rather
than this being pre‐given.7
Furthermore, our analysis implies that it is not enough to focus on
the epistemological responsibilities of knowers operating as
individuals, but that to be able to understand the domain better, we
also need to understand how epistemological responsibilities include
responsibilities toward sociability and technological mediation. In other
words, epistemological responsibilities of physicians not only include
the gathering, interpretation, and fitting together of evidence for each
patient but also include an openness toward evidence and interpreta-
tions, and knowledge claims made on their basis by other team mem-
bers, and making one's own interpretations accessible to others.
The socio‐technological epistemology that we are proposing
opens up several questions for further investigation: we have pointed
to issues about responsibilities of clinical decision‐making that need
further analysis, as well as issues in the development and validation
of new technologies and imaging tools. We end on a note regarding
the potential of the socio‐technological epistemology we propose to
open up new roles for philosophers and social scientists in participating
in the formation of clinical teams. Rephrasing John Hardwig quoted
earlier in the paper, our epistemological analysis of the social structure
of clinical decision‐making suggests that attending to the sociability of
clinical decision‐making is an essential aspect of what “makes the
members of some teams knowers while the members of others are
not”. This attention is something that philosophers and social scientists
could contribute to the understanding of clinical decision‐making.
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(NWO) and the Jo Kolk studiefonds.7There are further deep differences between our view and distributed
cognition that cannot be dealt with here. These are briefly differences on
the status of internal representations (our account takes a phenomenological
approach and bypasses these entirely); the espousal of many cognitivist
accounts of a computational theory or metaphoric framework of cognition,
which we do not adopt; and the view that (for example in Cunningham
2014: 187) artifacts are a subset of tools that assist people to perform
cognitive functions that they could otherwise perform for themselves.22 In
the same tradition, images and visualizations have also been understood as
distributed representations that aid visual thinking and communication in
distributed cognitive systems.42 On our account, artifacts, images, and visual-
izations are not only aids to thinking and communication, as this would take
into account only the first and second mediating roles described above; rather,
they have a further active mediating role in establishing a shared way of
seeing as a first step to shared modes of thought. The view taken in this
article is an extension of nonrepresentationalist accounts of images and
models that 1 of the authors has been systematically developing in several
publications, for example, Carusi (2016), Carusi and Hoel (2015) (see also
further references to Carusi & Hoel publications on this topic in those arti-
cles), and Carusi (2012).24,43,44 Nonrepresentationalism about perception and
knowledge is not a new position, but was most significantly advanced in phi-
losophy by the phenomenology of perception of Maurice Merleau‐Ponty
(1962; originally published in 1945)45; since then it has had numerous propo-
nents, including significant elaborations of the position in social sciences by,
for example, Lynch (1988), Goodwin (1994), Goodwin (1997), Sharrock and
Coulter (1998).46–49 In the tradition of cognitive sciences, it is espoused most
notably by Noë (2004).50REFERENCES
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